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Abstract: We present the Waterfilling circuit selection
method, which we designed in order to mitigate the risks
of a successful end-to-end traffic correlation attack. Wa-
terfilling proceeds by balancing the Tor network load
as evenly as possible on endpoints of user paths. We
simulate the use of Waterfilling thanks to the TorPS
and Shadow tools. Applying several security metrics,
we show that the adoption of Waterfilling considerably
increases the number of nodes that an adversary needs
to control in order to be able to mount a successful at-
tack, while somewhat decreasing the minimum amount
of bandwidth required to do so. Moreover, we evaluate
Waterfilling in Shadow and show that it does not impact
significantly the performance of the network. Further-
more, Waterfilling reduces the benefits that an attacker
could obtain by hacking into a top bandwidth Tor relay,
hence limiting the risks raised by such relays. Waterfill-
ing does not require any major change in Tor, and can
co-exist with the current circuit selection algorithm.
Keywords: Tor, Path selection algorithm, anonymity,
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1 Introduction
Tor is an implementation of an Onion Routing pro-
tocol designed to provide anonymity over the Inter-
net to TCP-based applications. Tor can be seen as a
distributed overlay network run by volunteer-operated
nodes where the users have an interest in remaining
anonymous when surfing on the web. Over the last few
years, the Tor network has grown from about 2000 to
roughly 7000 relays [4]. It provides anonymity by bounc-
ing the traffic through the network using a path of at
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least 3 relays among the pool of nodes and rotates the
path every 10 minutes [14].
However, anonymity is not a guaranteed prop-
erty. Tor is known by design to be unable to preserve
anonymity in a situation where an adversary observes
the traffic entering and leaving the anonymity network.
It is indeed possible for an adversary to retrieve the
identity of a Tor user and his destination by match-
ing the traffic at both endpoints of the anonymity net-
work. This attack is called end-to-end traffic correla-
tion and is considered in the literature to be a seri-
ous threat against anonymity networks. Many works
were conducted to demystify the consequences of this
threat over the Tor network. Global passive adversaries
have been studied with different correlation functions
to match streams entering and exiting the anonymity
network. From simple packet counting [7, 32] to timing
analysis [11, 24], the anonymity provided by the Tor
network has showed to be circumvented [29]. However,
such adversaries are too powerful and are not part of
the Tor original threat model [14]. More realistic pas-
sive adversaries have been studied, where either Au-
tonomous Systems (ASes) or internet exchange points
(IXPs) are compromised [15, 18, 28]. Experimental re-
sults have shown a probability of 20% to encounter the
same AS at both ends of a path inside the Tor network.
Johnson et al. [22] have also shown a probability of 95%
to be deanonymized in three months by a single IXP for
Tor users located in common places.
Monitoring parts of the Internet is not the only way
to perform traffic correlation: since the Tor network is
designed to be a volunteer-based network, an attacker
can also deploy nodes and use them to perform traffic
correlation, waiting for Tor users to pick these nodes
at the ends of their path. Johnson et al. [22] studied
the likelihood of such a comprised path when realistic
corrupted nodes are injected into the network. Results
shows a probability of 80% to encounter such a compro-
mised path within a 6-month period between 2012 and
2013 for a 100MiB/s relay adversary.
These results show the importance of fighting traffic
correlation. One approach is to design counter-measures
tailored to the traffic characteristics used to match
streams [24, 35]. While this approach has the potential
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of completely suppressing the feasibility of one specific
traffic correlation attack, it also leaves completely open
the possibility to use a different correlation measure-
ment method. A second approach, which we explore in
this paper, consists in designing the network in such a
way that it minimizes the probability that an adversary
could monitor both ends of a path through the Tor net-
work. This second approach cannot fully preclude the
feasibility of a correlation attack, but it is more robust
than the first one in the sense that it is independent of
the correlation detection method that is used. The two
approaches can of course be combined and can, in some
specific circumstances, interfere with each other [26].
Modifying the path selection algorithm in order to
reduce the feasibility of a traffic correlation attack is
most appealing if the overall performance of the net-
work stays unchanged. Currently, Tor uses a selection
process called Adjusted Bandwidth Weight Random
Selection (ABWRS) that combines bandwidth-weights
and nodes perceived bandwidth to apply the weighted
choice. The perceived bandwidth allows Tor clients to
bias toward relays with more available resources while
the bandwidth-weights allow to balance the load from
one position to another (e.g., if there is too much band-
width for the entry position, a fraction of each node
bandwidth is moved to the middle position).
Our contributions
In this paper, we explore a different way to achieve the
balance, providing a more uniform relay selection mech-
anism to Tor users. Waterfilling replaces the single frac-
tion of the bandwidth attributed to all relays for each
(available) position to a fraction defined per relay. While
not impacting the total bandwidth of the network, these
individual fractions make sure that low-bandwidth re-
lays devote most of their capacity to traffic at the end-
points of circuits, making it possible for high-bandwidth
relays to devote a larger part of their capacity to the
middle-point of circuits. As a result, top relays become
a considerably lower threat to anonymity compared to
the current Tor network state.
More precisely, in this paper:
– We suggest a modification of the current Adjusted
Bandwidth Weight Random Selection (ABWRS)
called Waterfilling Adjusted Bandwidth Weight
Random Selection (WFABWRS) or Waterfilling for
short. Waterfilling keeps the Tor network balanced
and provides either more diversity in both ends or
in one end of the Tor network, depending on the
network load case.
– In order to evaluate the impact of Waterfilling, we
use known metrics and propose a new one, based
on guessing entropy [25]. Our metric indicates the
expectation on the number of nodes to be compro-
mised before being able to mount a successful corre-
lation attack, and we believe that it provides useful
information on the security of the Tor network at a
given time.
– We provide a concrete analysis of the benefits of Wa-
terfilling based on simulations executed from con-
sensuses available for 5 months during 2015. Our
analysis shows that an attacker would be required
to control on average 150 extra nodes in order to
run a successful end-to-end correlation attack on a
targeted circuit, and that he would need to control
35 nodes in order to obtain the same benefits as if
he had compromised the top guard node during the
first half of 2015.
– We modified TorPS [5] in order to implement Wa-
terfilling and, on our way, we identified and fixed
an issue, which caused the results in previous pub-
lications to overestimate the success probability of
attacks. Our pull request has been merged in the
original github project.
– We developed a prototype of Waterfilling in the Tor
0.2.6.7 base code and we performed concrete perfor-
mance evaluations in the Shadow simulator, com-
paring Waterfilling with Tor’s ABWRS.
Roadmap
We start by reviewing the related works regarding path
selection algorithms and anonymity metrics in Section 2
and provide background information in Section 3. Then,
we dive into our subject in Section 4 explaining what is
Waterfilling and how we compute our new bandwidth-
weights. We then describe in Section 5 our threat model
and explain which metrics will be used and why they are
suitable. Our Section 6 gives the security analysis of Wa-
terfilling versus unmodified Tor using our metrics and an
empirical evaluation against relay adversaries. Our Sec-
tion 7 gives the performance analysis of Waterfilling in
terms of expected circuits latency and time to download
a web page or a large file. We discuss why Waterfilling
should be easy to deploy in Section 8, and we discuss
current limitations and open questions in Section 9. We
conclude in Section 10.
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2 Related Work
Path selection algorithms
In the original Tor design, the basis of the path selec-
tion algorithm was to select uniformly at random the
nodes needed to build a circuit. The reason to do this
was to meet the theoretical security level of Onion Rout-
ing against relay adversaries [39]. However this strategy
does not provide a good network performance for Tor
users in average, because relays offer very different band-
widths. Therefore, the selection moved to an adjusted
bandwidth weight random selection choice, making the
selection probability of a node proportional to the band-
width it offers (see details in Section 3.1). Several other
proposals of path selection algorithms have been made
during the past few years.
Snader and Borisov studied a tune-up to balance be-
tween the anonymity and performance properties [36].
LASTor from Akhoondi et al. [6] suggests a path se-
lection algorithm that reduces both the latency and the
risk to encounter a circuit where both entry and exit are
in the same Autonomous System (AS). Unfortunately,
LASTor does not result in a balanced network and suf-
fers from the same throughput issue as uniform selec-
tion. Hence, it cannot be deployed as it is suggested [40].
In a complementary way, some methodologies have
been developed to improve performance regarding la-
tency on the top of a path selection algorithm. In this
line of work, the “normal” path selection algorithm (or
another one) is used as a first step, but a second se-
lection step is proposed in order to filter among paths
obtained in the first step. Wang et al. [41] developed a
congestion-aware selection scheme that models the con-
gestion of a circuit as a node-based approach instead of
a link-based approach. In this case, the filtering is on
the top of the normal Tor adjusted bandwidth weighted
random selection. An interesting fact is that the conges-
tion computed for the nodes is not correlated with their
bandwidth, hence such a scheme does not unbalance
the network. Sherr et al. proposed a latency-aware link-
based path selection algorithm called Coordinate on the
top of Snader and Borisov’s scheme [34]. More recently,
Wacek et al. suggested hybridizing the “normal” path
selection algorithm with Coordinate and evaluated its
performance [40].
Hybridizing path selections or looking to improve an
existing idea have been welcomed and even integrated
in Tor in the past few years. In this line of work, we
have the Guard flag that is a response to protect against
the Predecessor Attack introduced by Wright et al. [2,
42]. Researchers evaluated also the well-funded values of
some policies. Elahi et al. [17] simulated various guard
related parameters to assert which approach might be
more interesting for Tor users, and Backes et al. [9] also
explored various path selection strategies.
DistribuTor
The closest proposal of our work is the suggestion by
Backes et al. at CCS’14 [8]. They present a path se-
lection called DistribuTor that redistributes the band-
widths based on computation performed on the client
side (and not by the Tor authorities). In DistribuTor, a
bandwidth upper bound is chosen by the client and the
choice of an exit node is based on both the bandwidth
available on the exit node and on that upper bound: the
probability of selecting an exit node is proportional to
its bandwidth, except that this bandwidth is considered
to be trimmed to the chosen upper bound, effectively
bounding the probability of selecting high bandwidth
nodes.
Our work differs from that one in several aspects:
– We focus on entry point, which is more important
for protection against correlation attacks.
– We push the definition of the probability selection of
the various nodes back to the directory authorities,
which helps maintaining a balanced network.
– We perform detailed security and performance anal-
ysis of our path selection algorithm.
Anonymity models and metrics
The general consensus from the literature regard-
ing modelling anonymity comes from Pfitzmann and
Hansen [30] and holds in a set of definitions. First of
all, anonymity is defined as the state of not being iden-
tifiable within a set of subjects called the anonymity
set. The anonymity set stands for the set of all prob-
able subjects. These subjects are linked to anonymous
actions which remain anonymous if an adversary can-
not distinguish the subjects on which they are executed.
The definitions of the subjects and their related anony-
mous actions are context dependent and defined regard-
ing the anonymity system studied. Surveys over anony-
mous systems were conducted in [12, 16], including mix
networks, Dining Cryptographers networks and Onion
Routing.
To quantify anonymity, we use probability distri-
bution about the set of subjects linked to the anony-
mous actions we study. From these probability distri-
butions, we extract information using the notion of en-
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tropy. Entropy provides a quantification of the uncer-
tainty involved in predicting on which subject is linked
our anonymous action. Depending on which information
we extract, we infer different meaning of the result.
Serjantov and Danezis [31] and Diaz et al. [13] are
the first to suggest the idea of using information the-
ory metrics such as Shannon’s entropy [33] to infer the
number of bits of additional information that the at-
tacker needs in order to definitely identify the subject.
Moreover, Diaz et al. suggested using a normalized ver-
sion of Shannon’s entropy as the degree of anonymity
for the system. A degree 0 means that the anonymity
system does not provide anonymity at all. A degree
1 means that the uncertainty is maximal. Snader and
Borisov [36] suggested using the Gini coefficient as a
measure of equality for the subjects. A Gini coefficient of
0 means that we have perfect equality between the sub-
jects. we cannot distinguish one from the other regard-
ing our anonymous action. A coefficient of 1 means a
perfect inequality. Those metrics have been extensively
used in the literature by the Tor community.
However, even if entropy is widely used, there are
some drawbacks to it. For instance, Syverson pointed
that Shannon entropy, as an average, does not neces-
sarily capture worst case situations [38]. If we take the
following example where we have a set of 1025 potential
senders of a message with 1024 of them having an equal
probability of 1/2048 to be the origin of the message,
and a single sender with probability of 1/2. We end up
having a degree of anonymity of 0.6 for this distribution
which is quite high regarding the fact that one sender
has a strong probability to be the source.
In the Tor community, some researchers started
to advocate the use of an empirical anonymity mea-
sure based on a well-defined adversary. Hamel et al.
suggested measuring the probability of path compro-
mise under an adversary with fixed bandwidth capabil-
ity [19]. Johnson et al. built a Tor Path Simulator to
mimic the Tor path selection over time and infer sta-
tistical confidence about first path compromise under a
fixed relay adversary [22]. We also use such metrics in
our anonymity evaluation.
3 Background
The Tor network is composed of different types of
nodes, onion proxies (Tor client), onion routers (re-
lays), directory servers, bridges and hidden servers. Di-
rectory servers are responsible for setting the network
up by publishing a consensus document every hour that
assigns a selection weight for each relay role. Those
weights are used to balance the network between the
three node positions respectively entry, middle and exit
nodes. A relay might have different roles and could act
as an exit but also as an entry and a middle node. Thus,
the weights allow the resources of a relay to be pro-
portionally distributed among the different roles that it
handles. The nodes are divided among the positions ac-
cording to some status flags assigned by the directory
servers. We have the Guard flag that allows a relay to
be picked out by the Tor client as its entry node in the
Tor network. Guard nodes must fulfill performance and
stability constraints, and we currently have a pool of
roughly 1600 Guards among all relays. An Exit flag is
also assigned to nodes that accept exit policies for range
of IP addresses and ports. Exit nodes are picked out by
the Tor client to be the node responsible to connect to
the requested service. The destination IP and port must
match the node exit policy, hence the pool of available
exit nodes depends on the service that the user wants
to access. All remaining relays are middle nodes.
3.1 Path selection in details
The description above showed that we have two entities
involved in the path selection: directory servers and Tor
clients.
Directory servers
The Tor Project provides documentation about Tor
specifications [1] and explains the responsibilities of di-
rectory servers. Among them, the weight computation
is our subject of interest. Weights are used to balance
the network among the positions, which arise from the
solution of a simple system of equations related to the
equality of the bandwidths from entry, middle and exit
positions. The system of equations from dir-spec.txt is:
Wgg.G+Wgd.D = M +Wmd.D +Wme.E +Wmg.G (1)
Wgg.G+Wgd.D = Wee.E +Wed.D (2)
D = Wed.D +Wmd.D +Wgd.D (3)
G = Wmg.G+Wgg.G (4)
E = Wme.E +Wee.E (5)
With:
– G being the total bandwidth for Guard-flagged
nodes
– M being the total bandwidth for non-flagged nodes
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– E being the total bandwidth for Exit-flagged nodes
– D being the total bandwidth for Guard+Exit-
flagged nodes
– Wgd being the weight for choosing a Guard+Exit
for the guard position
– Wmd being the weight for choosing a Guard+Exit
for the middle position
– Wed being the weight for choosing a Guard+Exit
for the exit position
– Wme being the weight for choosing an Exit for the
middle position
– Wmg being the weight for choosing a Guard for the
middle position
– Wgg being the weight for choosing a Guard for the
entry position
– Wee being the weight for choosing an Exit for the
exit position
This system constrains a bandwidth equality between
entry and middle nodes in equation (1). The same con-
straint is applied between middle nodes and exit nodes
in equation (2). Equations (3), (4) and (5) ensure that
the weights are consistent. Of course, these equations
cannot always be satisfied, when a resource (e.g., exit
nodes) is scarce in the network. In such cases, some of
these equations become inequalities, and the bandwidth
is allocated on a case-by-case basis: the Tor specification
divides all possibilities into 12 cases, and provides con-
straints for each of them.
It is worth noticing that this system of equations
achieves a balanced network condition regardless of the
bandwidth of each node independently. It only cares
about the sum of each pool (G,M , E, D). It results that
if we have to balance bandwidth from one position to
another, the same fraction of bandwidth is transferred
for each node.
Tor clients
Once the weights have been computed, voted and pub-
lished in a network status document, the Tor client uses
them to assign selection probability to each relay. Each
Tor client biases its selection according to the weights
received for each position and the consensus weight 1 of
the relays. We have:
ClientWeight(relayi,position p) = ConsensusWeighti∗Wpf
1 The consensus weight is called Bandwidth in the network sta-
tus document
With Wpf the weight computed by the directory server,
depending on the desired position and the flags of
relayi. Then, the Tor client makes a weighted random
choice among relays when building circuits, using all
computed ClientWeights. Consequently, if each Tor
user applies this strategy, the Tor network end up hav-
ing the same bandwidth consumed by relays for entry,
middle and exit positions2. Also, the ClientWeight of a
relay depends directly on its consensus weight which is
a value based on the perceived bandwidth of the relays
measured by the directory servers. We end up having
a selection probability of a relay for a specific position
that is directly proportional to its perceived bandwidth:
Pr[relayi, position p] =
ConsensusWeighti ∗Wpf∑
j ConsensusWeightj ∗Wpf
(6)
where the sum at the denominator ranges over all nodes
and Wpf is defined to be 0 for nodes that cannot be
placed in position p.
There is however a little extra complexity in the
selection process, as some constraints are placed on the
structure of a circuit:
– The exit node must have a policy accepting connec-
tions to the desired IP address and port;
– The same relay can not be chosen twice for the same
circuit;
– Two relays in the same family can not be chosen for
the same circuit;
– At most one relay selected in a given /16 subnet for
the same circuit.
We will not touch these constraints here.
4 Waterfilling
Bandwidth-Weights
We suggest changing the bandwidth weights computa-
tion method in order to maximize the diversity selection
in guard and exit position. Before diving into the equa-
tions and generalizing the concept, we show in the first
subsection the intuition behind our Waterfilling strat-
egy with an example.
2 Unless we fall into a scenario where the resource of a position
is too scarce
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4.1 Looking at the big picture
Figure 1 shows all guard-flagged nodes sorted by de-
creasing consensus weight (bandwidth). The dashed
blue line shows the total capacity of each guard-flagged
node received from the network status document. The
dotted green line shows the capacity of each guard-
flagged node dedicated to the entry position, which is
decided by the Wgg value from the network status doc-
ument. The capacity between those two lines is what
is transferred to the middle position to verify the equa-
tions previously introduced in Section 3.1. It is a shift of
resource from guards to unflagged nodes to obtain the
equivalence of total bandwidth consumption from each
position.
The plain red line is the result of our Waterfilling
scheme. It allows transferring the same amount of ca-
pacity to the middle position by moving from a global
Wgg to a per-node Wggi. Everything above the hor-
izontal red segment (the water level) is transferred to
the middle position. That is, we fill the smaller guard-
flagged nodes until a level where all above area enclosed
between the dashed blue line and the horizontal part of
the plain red line is equal to the area enclosed between
the dashed blue and dotted green lines. We allocate
resources differently but we shift the same amount of
capacity as with classic bandwidth-weights, thus leav-
ing the network capacity untouched. However, by us-
ing lower-bandwidth guards fully in their guard role,
and by capping the use of higher-bandwidth nodes for
guard traffic, we obtain a much more uniform proba-
bility distribution for guard node selection, which will
render correlation attacks more challenging to mount.
The network load case for this particular example
corresponds to a situation in which the bandwidth in
the exit position is scarce and the total bandwidth of
guard position is greater than the total bandwidth of
middle position. This situation corresponds to the third
case, subcase a in the Tor specification, and we write
it 3aE=SG>M. It is the most representative, and has
been observed 97.7% of the time during the first five
months of 2015. For the remaining percentage, we are
in a single network case, for which we propose a similar
Waterfilling strategy.
4.2 Computing Waterfilling bandwidth
weights
Following our example above, we first explain how to
compute the Waterfilling bandwidth weights through
Fig. 1. Waterfilling on guard nodes for the 10th consensus from
25th May 2015
the network load case 3aE=SG>M. For this network
load case, the Tor specification indicates to compute
the weights from the following equations:
Wee =Wed = 1; (7)
Wmd =Wgd =Wme = 0; (8)
Wgg = (G+M)/(2 ∗G) (9)
Wmg = 1−Wgg; (10)
We can apply Waterfilling toWgg whenWgg is nei-
ther 0 nor 1. Generally speaking, with another network
load case, we may also end up withWee orWed orWgd
not equal to 0 or 1. If this is the case, the following in-
troduced constraints can be symmetrically applied to
Wee and with a small modification to Wed and Wgd.
Now, based on these values, we compute the indi-
vidual weights Wggi of each guard node, from which
we can also derive the index N of the pivot node, which
the last guard to be “above the water level”, or the last
guard that is going to be used both as guard and middle
node. It is the point where the dashed blue line and the
horizontal part of the plain red line meet in Figure 1.
Suppose there are K nodes with the guard flag, and
let BWi be the bandwidth of the i-th guard node with
the highest bandwidth. Then the new constraints are:
Wggi ∗BWi =Wggi+1 ∗BWi+1 ∀i ∈ (1, N) (11)
Wggi = 1 ∀i ∈ (N + 1,K) (12)
0 ≤Wggi ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ (1,K) (13)
K∑
i=1
WggiBWi =Wgg ∗G (14)
Equation 11 expresses that all nodes before the
pivot must devote the same amount of bandwidth to the
guard position. Equation 12 expresses that all nodes af-
ter the pivot position will fully play their role as guards.
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Fig. 2. Better Waterfilling obtained from a recalculation of the
bandwidth-weights. Waterfilling is applied on guard nodes for the
10th consensus from 25th May 2015
Equation 13 guarantees that no node will be required to
offer more bandwidth than available, and Equation 14
guarantees that the total amount of bandwidth available
for the guard position remains unchanged compared to
the original Tor strategy, based on the unique Wgg.
From a visual point of view, this equation guarantees
that both grey areas have equal surface in Figure 1.
Solving with these constraints gives the weight
Wggi of each node, from which we compute Wmgi =
1−Wggi for each guard-flagged node.
4.3 Going further with Waterfilling
Waterfilling balances the network on the top of classical
bandwidth-weights. We may wonder if those bandwidth-
weights are always computed in a suitable way for Wa-
terfilling. In some scenarios, the equations 1 and 2
from Section 3 cannot be verified together: when either
(G+D) < T/3 or (E+D) < T/3.3 In the previous sec-
tion, we discuss a consensus where we have the second
scenario: (E + D) < T/3. In this scenario, we cannot
achieve a balance between the three positions. The way
Tor specifications suggests computing the weights for
this particular scenarios (Equations 7, 8, 9, 10) shows
that they verify the equation 1 but release equation 2
to an inequality. We have:
Wgg.G+Wgd.D = M +Wmd.D +Wme.E +Wmg.G
(15)
Wgg.G+Wgd.D > Wee.E +Wed.D
(16)
Therefore, they equalize the bandwidth between guards
and middles. We may achieve a better balance for Wa-
terfilling: equalizing the bandwidth between exits and
guards and pushing what remains to the middle posi-
3 T being the total bandwidth: T=G+M+E+D
tion. The equations become:
Wgg.G+Wgd.D < M +Wmd.D +Wme.E +Wmg.G
(17)
Wgg.G+Wgd.D = Wee.E +Wed.D
(18)
Achieving the balance this way reduces the Wgg value
compared to the first approach. It becomes:
Wgg = (E +D)/G (19)
We can compare Figure 1 and Figure 2 when Wa-
terfilling is applied on these two approaches. On Fig-
ure 1, the pivot is around the 340th node while on Fig-
ure 2, it is around the 400th node. Consequently, the
water level is smaller than with the approach from Tor
specifications. Hence, the probability selection on guard
nodes are closer to the uniform distribution. We may
also wonder if this approach reduces the performance
of the network. Intuitively, we have now two positions
where congestion might occur instead of one. We an-
swer this concern in our performance analysis explained
in Section 7.
5 Security Models and Metrics
5.1 Threat Model
Since its initial design, Tor has been known to lack ef-
ficient protection against end-to-end traffic correlation.
Solving this problem might be impossible or at least ex-
tremely difficult for any low-latency anonymity network.
Existing techniques such as padding [35] have shown to
be too costly to be deployable while other techniques
such as delaying cells or defensive dropping [24] have
shown to be ineffective in practice. One way to prevent
end-to-end traffic correlation is to accept it and to strive
to minimize its impact while guaranteeing a high quality
of service.
In this threat model, an adversary controls a bunch
of nodes in order to perform end-to-end traffic corre-
lation when a Tor user is passing through one of its
guards and exits nodes. Following Murdoch et al. [27], a
realistic view of a relay adversary considers both IP ad-
dresses and bandwidth to contribute to a cost that the
attacker tries to minimize. We consider two variants of
this model:
– Budget relay adversary: An adversary deploying its
own relays into the network. The budget is fulfilled
by the cost of the bandwidth and the IP addresses.
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In order to avoid obvious detection, a relay adver-
sary would take different /16 if he chooses to deploy
several nodes, and distribute them into different
data centers, hence increasing its costs proportion-
ally to the number of nodes and total bandwidth.
– Intruder relay adversary: An adversary hacking into
existing Tor relays, servers or private computers.
In this case, the bandwidth has little direct influ-
ence on the cost, since the attacker does not pay
for it. The cost will instead be related to the num-
ber of machines that need to be corrupted, and to
their level of protection. Here, a generic botnet is
unlikely to offer a good strategy for an adversary,
due to the regular downtime of the corrupted ma-
chines [37], and more efforts will then be needed.
At the other extreme of the spectrum, big existing
relays are likely to be top targets for such an ad-
versary, at least in the current Tor path selection
algorithm: these relays already handle a major part
of the traffic due to the current path selection al-
gorithm. Besides, the visible effects of a corruption
will be lower, since this corruption does not add a
new relay traffic on the network. In all cases, due
to the relatively high profile of the machines to be
corrupted (they need to be able to obtain the guard
flag), the number of machines to corrupt appears to
be an important measure of the adversary effort.
Based on these observations, we will evaluate the cost
of a successful correlation attack both in terms of relays
that need to be corrupted and total bandwidth that is
required, the relative weight of these depending on the
exact setting and willingness of the adversary to hack
into other computers.
We make the assumption that a correlation is in-
stantaneous and perfect. Notice that network adver-
saries are not taken into account in this model.
5.2 Metrics
In order to evaluate the impact of our Waterfilling strat-
egy, we use three anonymity metrics.
Our first metric, used in related works, is the uni-
formity degree of circuit selection, computed as Diaz’s
degree of anonymity [13] over the probability distribu-
tion of selected guard-exit pairs in the Tor network. This
metric gives an indication of how well the network is ex-
ploited at a given point in time, and is normalized (that
is, independent of the network size).
Our second metric is based on the notion of guess-
ing entropy [25], and indicates the expected number
of nodes that an adversary should control in order to
mount a successful end-to-end traffic correlation attack.
This metric is related to the previous one in the sense
that it also focuses on the state of the network at a
single point in time, but it provides a more concrete
information to the user.
The last metric we use is the probability distribution
on time until first path compromise, which is an empir-
ical metrics from Johnson et al. [22]. Contrary to the
other two, this metric adopts a dynamic perspective by
considering, across a certain amount of time, the success
probability of an adversary who controls a predefined
number of nodes and offers a predefined bandwidth on
these nodes.
5.2.1 Uniformity degree of circuit selection
The uniformity degree of circuit selection measures how
close to uniform is the selection process of a guard and
an exit node for a circuit. It shows a first interesting
indication of the resistance of the network to end-to-
end correlation attacks.
This uniformity degree is computed by evaluating
the probabilities pi,j , which indicate, for all i and j,
the probability of picking the guard i with exit j in a
circuit. Then the Shannon entropy of this distribution
is computed as: H(Y ) = −∑Ni=1∑Kj=1 pi,j log2(pi,j).
This quantity is then normalized to the maximum
entropy HM that this distribution could have, which is
computed as log2(N ∗K), where N and K are the size
of the set of guard and exit nodes respectively.
So, the uniformity degree d of a circuit selection
process is computed as: d = H(Y )HM .
Note that it may not be desirable to obtain a unifor-
mity degree of 1, as it would not take into account any
topological aspect of the circuit, for which policies are
in place (e.g., we cannot have two same /16 addresses
in the circuit).
The uniformity degree of circuit selection is interest-
ing to compare the quality of a path selection algorithm
on different states of the Tor network that do not nec-
essarily contain the same number of nodes.
We evaluate this metric by using the TorPS tool to
run simulations of the original and Waterfilling based
circuit selection processes, based on various consensuses
from the first five months of 2015: these simulations offer
estimations of the pi,j values, from which the uniformity
degree can be evaluated as defined above.
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5.2.2 Guessing entropy
The uniformity degree provides an interesting indica-
tion on the distribution of the circuit selection process,
but does not provide a measure that can easily be inter-
preted in terms of success probability of an end-to-end
correlation attack: Shannon entropy is an average mea-
sure, not a worst-case one, and the normalization aspect
makes it possible to obtain a very high degree of unifor-
mity even for a Tor network that could contain 3 nodes.
In order to address these questions, we propose us-
ing the notion of guessing entropy, as a measure of the
number of nodes that an adversary must expect to con-
trol or compromise before being able to deanonymize a
specific circuit.
The guessing entropy is computed from the same
probabilities pi,j as above, by ranking the relays in de-
creasing order of their contribution to the success prob-
ability of a successful end-to-end correlation attack.
We then define qi as the marginal probability of a
successful attack (that is, the increase of success prob-
ability of the attack resulting of the compromise of the
i-th node), and evaluate the guessing entropy of the re-
sulting distribution:
g =
N+K∑
i=1
i.qi
Of course, we always have q1 = 0 because we cannot
mount a correlation attack from a single compromised
node, but we choose the first node in order to maximize
the impact of the compromise of a second node. In order
to compute the remaining elements of our vector q, we
keep selecting nodes in a monotonic way such that qi
is maximal with respect to the i − 1 already selected
nodes.
PrG=x = max
(∑
y∈q
Pr(G = x,E = y)∀x /∈ q
)
(20)
PrE=y = max
(∑
x∈q
Pr(G = x,E = y)∀y /∈ q
)
(21)
qi = max(PrG=x, P rE=y) (22)
An example is available in Appendix A.1.
This selection process corresponds to a monotonic
strategy in which the adversary compromises relays one
after the other, looks for the best choice based on the
relays that he already compromised, and does so until
his attack succeeds.
This strategy is definitely more effective than simply
looking for individual nodes from the two sets and con-
structing the product of the distributions rather than
our joint distribution, as shown by Johnson et al. [21].
A more effective attacker strategy would be to select
sets of relays to be jointly compromised instead of pick-
ing them one by one, but such a strategy would also
be considerably more difficult to translate into a simple
metric due to combinatorial explosion.
5.2.3 Time until first compromise
This measure gives an estimate of the evolution over
time of the probability until a first path compromise
happens, for an adversary controlling a specific set of
nodes.
To evaluate this measure, we repeatedly simulated
the circuit selection process of a client during a period
of 5 months using TorPS, and used these simulations
to estimate the probability of building a compromised
circuit over time. We applied this strategy with the cur-
rent Tor selection scheme and with our modified Tor
Waterfilling selection scheme, for comparison. More de-
tails about our relay adversary are given in Section 6.
This measure has the advantage of giving an in-
teresting insight regarding a concrete threat, as far as
TorPS correctly mimics Tor circuit selections. And, as a
complement information to the metrics discussed above,
this one integrates a dynamic aspect of circuit compro-
mise over time, and not just at a given point in time,
hence taking into account path rotation and relay insta-
bilities.
However, it is also a very specific measure, that is
essentially valid for a particular choice of relay adversary
and the time period that is chosen.
6 Security Analysis
We now evaluate our Waterfilling scheme by comparison
with the current Tor path selection process, based on the
three metrics discussed in the previous section.
6.1 Methodology
To evaluate the security of the Tor network with respect
to our threat model, we need to compute the probability
distribution of node selection. There are multiple ways
to do it. A first one would have been to use the equations
from Sections 3.1 and derive probabilities accordingly.
However, the resulting distribution would not account
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for the extra path construction policies (e.g., no pair
of nodes from the same /16 range on a single circuit)
or for realistic user behaviors (e.g., it does not take into
account exit policies that can also shape path selection).
In order to obtain more realistic results, we used
the TorPS tool with the objective to evaluate the prob-
ability distribution considering the typical user model
from [22]. This user model has been designed to mimic
average Tor use with simulated connections to Gmail
/ Google Chat, Google Calendar/Docs, Facebook and
web search.
While working with TorPS, we noticed and fixed
an issue where the addition of relay adversary band-
width was not considered in the computation of the
bandwidth-weights. Thus, adding nodes in the simu-
lated network made TorPS inaccuratly reflect Tor’s path
selection: the higher the injected bandwidth, the further
the TorPS results diverged from the reality. As a result,
our simulation results should not be directly compared
to those obtained by Johnson et al. [22].
We studied the anonymity of the Tor network over
the first 5 months of the year 2015 4. Inside this range,
we pick 20 given moments for each type of network
load/resource scarcity appearing in this period. From
these simulations we evaluate our various metrics.
We also compare our Waterfilling scheme and Tor’s
ABWRS against a relay adversary. For both schemes,
we compute the time until the first compromise path
and we discuss different relay adversary strategies.
6.2 Analysis
During the first 5 months of 2015, only two of 12 pos-
sible network load cases have been observed: in both
cases pure exit nodes were scarce (E < T/3); most of
the time adding the nodes with the guard and exit flags
was not enough to remove scarcity (E +D < T/3, case
3aE=SG>M) but, at a few moments, they were suffi-
cient (E + D ≥ T/3, case 3bE=S). Figures 3 and 4
show how the uniformity degree of circuit selection and
guessing entropy evolve between various points in time
for these two network load cases. Our analysis focuses
on guards rather than on exit nodes: when exit nodes
are scarce, no Waterfilling strategy can be applied (or,
in other words, the water level reaches the consensus
4 We wanted to update with first semester of 2016 but the Stem
library used by TorPS is outputting many errors when reading
descriptors. We got then many missing descriptors.
weight of the fastest exit node). Figure 3 uses equations
from Section 4.3 recomputing the bandwidth-weights
and applying Waterfilling on the top of them using the
constraints 11, 12, 13 and 14 from Section 4.2. For Wa-
terfilling simulations on Figure 4, we use equations from
Section 4.2 because, for this network load case, a bal-
ance between the three positions is achieved. For this
network scenario, we still have too much bandwidth in
the guard position. We apply Waterfilling constraints
11, 12, 13 and 14 to obtain a per-node Wggi. We also
apply Waterfilling on the D set since (E +D) ≥ T/3 as
depicted in the appendix.
In all cases, we observe that these metrics favor
the Waterfilling scheme over Tor’s ABWRS: we have
an improvement of around 150 nodes for network case
3aE=SG>M and about 130 nodes for network case
3bE=S. It is an increase of about ≈ 25% for the guess-
ing entropy and an increase of about ≈ 2% for degree
of uniformity (which is harder to interpret). The differ-
ence that appears in the metrics between those two net-
work cases can be explained. For 3bE=S, the network
achieves a balance for the three positions but not for
the network case 3aE=SG>M. It results that the net-
work should achieve better performance for case 3bE=S
than case 3aE=SG>M but less diversity because, for
3aE=SG>M we can put in practice the idea introduced
in Section 4.3.
We also observe an overall correlation between these
two metrics: both are impacted by the uniformity of the
probability distribution. But, divergences also happen,
as the guessing entropy takes also into account the num-
ber of guards and exits: the more we have guards and
exits in the network, the higher would be the guessing
entropy (except if the distribution is highly non uni-
form), while such a change may not impact the degree
of uniformity. As a result, a variation of nodes in the
network between two given moments like the loss of a
bunch of guards may result in a drop of the guessing
entropy while the degree of uniformity could stay iden-
tical.
Entropy measures are a good estimation of
anonymity at a given moment for overall usage but they
might also be suitable to compare particular user be-
haviour. Indeed, the guessing entropy would have been
smaller in Figures 3 and 4 if we had considered bit-
torent download as user model instead of simple HTTP
requests, due to the smaller number of exit nodes that
allow bittorent ports. On the other hand, the degree of
uniformity could fail to show that bittorent users are less
protected against end-to-end traffic correlation, simply
because the probability distribution of exit nodes allow-
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Fig. 3. Anonymity metrics over 20 given moments where
network load case is 3a exit nodes are scarce and there is
more bandwidth in Guard position than in middle position
(3aE=SG>M) during 01-2015 to 05-2015. Waterfilling sim-
ulations use equations from Section 4.3
Fig. 4. Anonymity metrics over 20 given moments where
network load case is 3b and exit nodes are scarce (3bE=S)
during 01-2015 to 05-2015
ing bittorent might have the same shape as the probabil-
ity distribution of exit nodes allowing HTTP requests.
We saw from [38] and [22] that measuring
anonymity at a static point in time might not be suf-
ficient: an adversary may keep monitoring the network
for some time and, depending on the way users update
their circuits, have a lower or higher probability of win-
ning and end-to-end correlation attack at some point in
time. But, as Waterfilling does not impact the circuit
evolution strategy, the time evolution is the same for
both approaches.
In the spirit of the work of Johnson et al. [22], we
may still wonder about the concrete impact of a spe-
cific adversary over time. Figure 5 shows the time until
first compromise circuit obtained from TorPS with a re-
lay adversary owning a guard with a consensus weight
value of 480, 310 and an exit with consensus weight value
of 282, 607. Both values have been chosen by computing
the consensus weight average of the top-1 guard and exit
among the 5-month time period. In the current design
of relay selection, top guards are a threat to anonymity
since they handle the major part of the traffic in the en-
try position. Our Waterfilling scheme largely mitigates
this issue: Figure 5 shows a drop from ≈ 24% probabil-
ity to use a compromised path after 5 months to ≈ 2%.
This results from the fact that, with Waterfilling, most
of the capacity of the adversary guard is used for the
middle position, and no single node runs a very signifi-
cant part of the guard traffic.
Fig. 5. Empirical evaluation of time to first compromise path
- With numEntryGuards=3 - We add 1 adversary guard with
480,310 cons weight, 1 adversary exit with 282,607 cons weight
Effect of Waterfilling on guard rotation
We may also consider the potential interaction that Wa-
terfilling applied on guards could have on guard rota-
tion. In theory, the guard rotation period is randomized
between 2 and 3 months. However, in practice, clients
rotate guards more often on average due to guard nodes
losing their flag or vanishing from the network. Using
Waterfilling, we may consider an eventual impact on
the average guard rotation period. Indeed, using more
smaller guards may affect the expected amount that
clients must choose additional guards due to a differ-
ence in reachability/uptime with respect to bigger guard
nodes. We used TorPS to investigate this phenomenon.
Figure 6 shows a comparison between two simulations.
We compare results for classical Tor with 1 adversar-
ial guard of 480, 310 consensus weight with the Water-
filling experiment given 35 adversarial guards cumulat-
ing 298, 752 consensus weight (62.2% of 480, 310). We
use 62.2% of the consensus weight because at average,
guards were used at 62.2%of their bandwidth in the en-
try position (and 37.8% in the middle position). While
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Fig. 6. Empirical evaluation of time to first compromise path - 35
adversarial guards cumulating 298,752 cons weight (Waterfilling)
versus 1 guard of 480,310 cons weight (Tor ABWRS).
Fig. 7. Probability to end up using a guard from the top-16 coun-
tries. Like in Section 4, the 10th consensus from 25th May 2015
is used.
with Waterfilling, smaller guards below the water level
are used at 100% of their bandwidth in the entry posi-
tion. If we were in an ideal situation, where guard nodes
never disappears, both curves would perfectly match.
Using historical data of the Tor network, Figure 6 shows
that using Waterfilling, the average guard rotation is
slightly faster over time, leading to a higher probability
of compromise (+ ≈ 1%). It means that smaller guards
tend to be slightly less stable than top guards, but hope-
fully not that much.
Security against network adversaries
Despite the fact that network adversaries are not con-
sidered by our security model, we may still be curious
regarding the impact that Waterfilling has against them.
We use equations 6 from Section 3 to compute the se-
lection probabilities of guard nodes. We group them by
country and autonomous system, which allows us to
compare the network diversity provided by Waterfilling
and Tor ABWRS against these two types of network
adversary. Figure 7 shows an overall similarity between
ABWRS Waterfilling
AS12876:15.73% AS16276:18.21%
AS16276:13.26% AS12876:11.24%
AS24940:10.87% AS24940:10.82%
AS24961:4.42% AS24961:3.54%
AS8972: 3.71% AS200130:2.08%
Table 1. Probability to end up using a guard from the Top-5 AS
the two schemes. An overall diversity improvement or
degradation compared to Tor ABWRS would be a sign
of correlation between the size of relays and their lo-
calization. Here, we see in Figure 7 some changes to the
few top countries where the probability to end up in the
2-top countries is a little bit decreased, from 57.41% to
54.01%. However, US jumps from 8.14% to 13.64%. It
means that among the few top countries, the US hosts
the highest number of guards with a lot of them below
the water level. Table 1 shows AS16276 (OVH Hosting
located in US) jumping from 13.26% to 18.21%, which
explains the US jump on Figure 7. In the meantime,
AS12867 (Online S.A.S located in France) being the
most interesting AS to tap in (containing top guards)
is loosing interest. In any case, it seems hard to draw
any clear conclusions from these numbers, as they are
going both ways, and could change with the evolution
of the Tor relay localization and bandwidth. This is a
consequence of our choice to focus the application of
Waterfilling at the relay level rather than at a higher
aggregation level (country, AS, . . . ) (see also discussion
in Section 9.1).
7 Performance Analysis
We now evaluate the performance impact of Waterfilling
on a simulated Tor network run in Shadow [20].
7.1 Methodology
To evaluate the performance, we implemented Water-
filling in the Tor source code and ran several simula-
tions in a virtual network. We constructed a topology
scaled down to 796 relays from a consensus in May 20165
(195 guard-flagged nodes, 501 unflagged nodes, 56 exit-
flagged nodes, 43 guardexit-flagged nodes, 3 directory
authorities and 1 bandwidth authority). The virtual
5 2016-05-28-01-00-00 precisely
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network topology is built to mimic the current inter-
net structure with geographic clustering by country as
explained in Jansen and Hopper [20]. We generate two
classes of experiments. The first one shows simulations
in a low network load where we simulated 1125 web
clients with 3% of them performing only bulk transfer.
Moreover, we have 75 perf clients for each of 50KiB,
1MiB and 5MiB file size. The overall throughput of this
setup is on average ≈120 MiB/s, which is proportion-
ally small compared to the traffic load handled by the
current Tor network. The second class of experiments
shows simulations in a heavy loaded network propor-
tionally close to the throughput of the real Tor net-
work if we don’t take into account internal traffic. We
run 3000 web clients with 10% performing bulk trans-
fer. Moreover, we still have 75 perf clients for each of
the file size mentioned above. Altogether, those clients
push ≈ 550 MiB/s, which is ≈ 63% of the total capac-
ity dedicated to the exit position (E+D) in our virtual
network.
In both class of experiments, the geographical loca-
tion of the clients are set up according to Tor’s directly
connecting user statistics [3]. These clients are perform-
ing HTTP GET requests to 130 servers with geographic
locations assigned using the Alexa Top Sites data set.
Therefore, the Tor circuits built by those clients and
connecting to the servers should be representative of
the real Tor circuits built over the Internet.
7.2 Analysis
We study the impact of Waterfilling with two perfor-
mance metrics: the time to first byte (ttfb) and the time
to last byte (ttlb). The first metric shows responsiveness
of the network while the second one captures the over-
all performance. The first class of experiments is under
light load, Figure 8 shows no performance discrepancy
when using Waterfilling. We may explain latency results
(Figure 8a) in the following way: regarding responsive-
ness of the network, we have two phenomena to consider.
relay-based latency and link-based latency. Relay-based
latency has shown to be uncorrelated with relay band-
width in a previous work [41], thus it does not inter-
fere. Link-based latency is more interesting. To explain
why we observe no difference, we may use the following
example. Let’s suppose that top-bandwidth guards are
connected to better links compared to low-bandwidth
guards. Therefore, at average, the part of the Tor cir-
cuits surrounding guards would suffer from higher la-
tency when using Waterfilling because the clients use
guards more uniformly. However, the reverse is applied
with middle nodes because we use them less uniformly
than current Tor’s ABWRS. In average, the part of
the Tor circuit surrounding middle nodes would have
less latency due to a higher utilization of good links
surrounding top nodes. So, with these hypotheses, we
should expect more latency through guards and less la-
tency through middles. Because ttfb only cares about
the global latency of Tor circuits, these differences tie
summed up on average, and we obtain the same result.
The ttlb metrics (Figures 8b, 8c) confirms our intu-
ition that Waterfilling does not modify the overall per-
formance of the network because it keeps the same to-
tal amount of bandwidth for each position, as classical
bandwidth-weights. Moreover, we also ran a simulation
with half of the clients using Waterfilling weights while
the other half are using classical bandwidth-weights. As
expected, both techniques can be used simultaneously
in the network without impacting the performance. This
result allows a smooth transition from Tor ABWRS to
Waterfilling or a coexistence if it does not reduce the
anonymity set. More details are discussed in Section 8.
Section 4.3 discussed that the classical bandwidth
weights can be calculated in a way that improves Wa-
terfilling even more, achieving what we wanted: balanc-
ing the Tor network with maximum diversity. The new
bandwidth-weights induce the same scarcity between
end positions and push what remains to the middle po-
sition. Hence, instead of having only one position with
low capacity (exit), we now have two positions with
low but equal capacity (entry and exit). In Figure 9,
we investigate if such strategy lowers performance. Un-
der light load, the result show that such strategy does
not raise the latency or lower the overall performance
of the network. The Bwweights modified curves are the
bandwidth-weights recalculated using the strategy de-
scribed in Section 4.3.
The second class of results are experiments under a
loaded network. Figure 10 shows that congestion is in-
creased when using Waterfilling. About 3% of the worst
circuits become a little bit worse, meaning that a few cir-
cuits are more likely to suffer from congestion. However,
Figure 10c shows that this degradation seems not to ap-
pear for large bulk transfers. A surprising and welcom-
ing result comes from the strategy where we apply Wa-
terfilling on the top of recalculated bandwidth-weights.
We expected to have more congestion with two posi-
tions scarce instead of one. However, the results show
that congestion is reduced compared to Waterfilling on
the top of classical bandwidth-weights. It seems that
pushing as much bandwidth as we can to the middle po-
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(a) Time to first byte (ttfb) (b) Time to download 320 KiB (ttlb) (c) Time to download 5 MiB (ttlb)
Fig. 8. Network performance under light load (796 relays, 1125 web clients with 30 bulk clients, 75 perf clients for each of 50KiB,
1MiB and 5MiB file size performing an average throughput of ≈ 120 MiB/s altogether). Comparison of Waterfilling fully used on all
clients versus Tor’s ABWRS used on all clients versus mix 50% of clients doing Waterfilling and 50% of clients doing Tor’s ABWRS –
The topology generated is scaled down from the first consensus from May 28, 2016. Graphs are plotted until percentile 0.99.
(a) Time to first byte (b) Time to download 320 KiB (c) Time to download 5 MiB
Fig. 9. Going further with Waterfilling: network performance under light load. Tor with bwweights modified means that we have used
equation 19 on Tor’s ABWRS to obtain the same capacity between entry en exit while pushing what remains to the middle position.
Applying Waterfilling on the top of this weight computation gives a more uniform selection probability compared to Waterfilling on the
top of classical bandwidth weights. Graphs are plotted until percentile 0.99.
sition has a good impact for the network performance.
Since applying Waterfilling on the top this choice im-
proves also anonymity (Section 6), this result is very
welcome. Moreover, pushing as most as we can to the
middle position is probably the right thing to do be-
cause the balance performed by the bandwidth-weights
assumes 3-hop Tor circuits even thought it is not always
true. Indeed, Tor circuits carrying hidden service traf-
fic are composed of 2 guards and 4 middles. Moreover,
there are also some weird users configurations (such as
more than 1 middle node) in the wild. Therefore, we
may expect that pushing every exceeding resource to
the middle position would give even better performance
results on the real Tor network compared to our simu-
lations.
8 Deployment
Deploying Waterfilling would not raise performance is-
sues and allows a smooth transition between the current
path selection and Waterfilling. In theory, the equations
from Sections 3.1 and 4.2 explain this claim because
they still hold in the same way. However, in practice,
some other issues might be captured. We conducted
the performance analysis using Shadow in Section 7
and showed classical bandwidth-weights and Waterfill-
ing can be used together by different Tor clients in the
network without disturbing it. The only thing that could
be observed from the relay operator’s viewpoint is either
a slow transition of their relay bandwidth consumption
from entry to middle or exit to middle if their relay ca-
pacity dedicated to this position is higher than the water
level or a slow transition from middle to entry or mid-
dle to exit if their dedicated relay capacity is smaller
than the water level. The time needed for the tran-
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(a) Time to first byte (b) Time to download 320 KiB (c) Time to download 5 MiB
Fig. 10. Network performance under loaded traffic (≈550 MiB/s, 63% of E+D advertised bandwidth). Comparison of Waterfilling fully
used on all clients versus Tor’s ABWRS fully used on all clients. Graphs are plotted until percentile 0.98.
sition would depend on Tor users updating their Tor
client. Hopefully, since Tor 5.x.x, the Tor browser auto-
updates, which would bring up to date with Waterfilling
a major fraction of Tor users.
The deployment security risk
As explained by Backes et al. [9], the transition phase
or a co-existence of path selection algorithms might be
a threat to the anonymity. A bunch of compromised
middle nodes might distinguish Waterfilling users from
ABWRS users. Moreover, they can also have an idea
of what type of service they are accessing, looking at
the exit policies. In the case of a transition phase, the
first few users switching to the new path selection al-
gorithm are vulnerable. In the case of a co-existence of
path selection algorithms, the users are not vulnerable
if the transition is finished and both anonymity sets are
considered large enough. Hopefully, we could manage
to achieve a secure transition phase with a consensus
parameter that would be turned on to authorize Water-
filling when enough users have updated.
We specify here a proposal of which type of change
should be made in the directory protocol in order for it
to be deployed. We suggest modifying the network sta-
tus document [1] and add a parameter in params called
«UseWaterfilling »with possible values 0 or 1. When 0
is set, classical bandwidth-weights are used. When 1 is
set, the network status document has to give per-node
bandwidth-weight values with at most 7 new weights
depending on which set(s) Waterfilling is applied to
(guards, exits, guards+exits are 3 disjoint sets leading
to a possible modification of Wgg, Wmg, Wee, Wme,
Wgd, Wed, Wmd). We suggest adding an item called
"wfbw" to each router status entry followed by the op-
tional weights in the form Wfp =< value >.
9 Limitations and Future Work
The previous sections discussed the impact of Waterfill-
ing on the design of end-to-end correlation attacks and
its expected impact on the efficiency of the Tor network.
We now discuss some open questions and possible ad-
versarial reactions to Waterfilling.
9.1 Adversary position and cost structure
Our analysis focused on an adversary running an end-to-
end correlation attack by controlling network relay, with
a primary focus on the number of relays that would need
to be controlled in order to mount a successful attack.
This captures an adversary who would mount his attack
by hacking into existing relays, assuming that the cost is
proportional to the number of machines to compromise,
or paying an infrastructure for running relays, in which
the number of relays to run would be an important part
of the cost (matching the cost structure of many cloud
service providers, for instance).
Other adversary positions and cost structure could
be considered, though.
From one to many relays threat
The analysis in Section 6 shows that the Waterfilling
strategy is very effective against adversaries targeting
top relays: it forces an adversary to monitor a number
of relays in order to achieve what he could obtain from
a single relay right now. This situation holds if we con-
sider relays as individual threats. This is a reasonable
assumption in the current path selection since dividing
the bandwidth into multiple relays increases the cost
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without increasing the utility in term of attack effec-
tiveness.
With Waterfilling, the situation changes. Adver-
saries could react by taking control (or creating) a large
number of relays with a more limited amount of band-
width. Assuming that the adversary focuses on relays
that offer an amount of bandwidth close to the “water
level”, we can evaluate the number of relays that need
to be controlled in order to achieve the same effect as
controlling the top guard in the current network.
As explained in Section 6, we observed that the top
guard achieved an average consensus weight of 480,310
during the first half of 2015. We also observe that the
average value of Wgg during the same time period is
62.2%, meaning that 480, 310 ∗ 0.622 ≈ 298, 752 of the
consensus weight of the top guard is devoted to its guard
role. During that same period, the water level was as
low as 8710. So, in order to achieve the same consensus
weight in total, we see that 298, 752/8710 ≈ 35 nodes
are needed.
We suspect (and leave for further research) that
moving from an individual threat model to a multiple-
relays threat model is beneficial to the Tor network:
running such a strategy would be more difficult for the
adversary:
– Regarding budget adversaries, the attacker would
have to launch and run his botnet of guard nodes
in such a way that would not raise suspicion. The
proper way would be to imitate the appearance dis-
tribution of other guard nodes, in time and localiza-
tion. The attacker would need a higher amount of
time to be fully operational and would face the dif-
ficulty to find proper datacenters to put his nodes.
We suspect that Waterfilling increases the effort to
set up an effective botnet, hence increasing the bud-
get.
– Regarding Intruder adversaries, we see that the ad-
versary now needs to hack into 35 computers in-
stead of one, which must be quite more complex.
Using Waterfilling saves the top-bandwidth relays
from also being top targets.
A potential downside of Waterfilling could appear if we
focus on the bandwidth required to mount an attack
rather than on the number of nodes that need to be
controlled. Indeed, thanks to the unique value Wgg in
the current Tor network, only 62.2% of the bandwidth
controlled by the attacker is used for the guard role, and
this is the useful part for running an end-to-end corre-
lation attack. Waterfilling provides additional utility in
terms of attack effectiveness if the attacker splits the
bandwidth in multiple relays at the water level. When
using Waterfilling, an adversary aiming for nodes below
or up to the water level can hope to have 100% of its
bandwidth allocated to its guard role. As a result, even
if the adversary needs to control 35 nodes with Water-
filling instead of one, he only needs to provide 62.2% of
the bandwidth that he would need to offer in the current
Tor network. An open question is to evaluate the cost
of running many nodes to benefit from this additional
utility versus the cost of the same utility in the current
Tor network.
An interesting adversary reaction against Waterfill-
ing is to take advantage of a botnet structure: among
many compromised computers, a few of them might
have the required bandwidth and be stable enough to ac-
quire the Guard flag. Such adversary would obtain the
additional utility provided by Waterfilling at an addi-
tional cost of none, compared to the current path selec-
tion. An open question would be to evaluate the number
of such compatible botnets in the wild and what would
be the cost of running one of them.
One mitigation of this many-relays threat would be
to make a new use of the NodeFamily: we could apply
Waterfilling by considering nodes with the same position
and within the same family as a single node. As a result,
n guards belonging to the same family and all offering a
bandwidth equal to the water level would be selected to
offer a total guard bandwidth equal to the water level
(and not n times that level).
Network adversaries
Analysis in the paper did not show any significant im-
pact of Waterfilling against AS adversaries, given recent
localizations of the Tor network relays. But this could
change, for the better or for the worse, as new relays
appear or disappear. If network adversaries are decided
to be the major threat compared to relay-level adver-
saries, then an interesting open question would be to
explore the impact of applying Waterfilling at the AS
or country level rather than at the relay level. One con-
tribution to the security analysis in this field [10, 22, 23]
would be to use our guessing entropy to calculate the
number of ASes that an adversary must expect to con-
trol or compromise before being able to deanonymize a
specific circuit. Network adversary reactions should be
taken into account in the analysis. Regarding the per-
formance aspect, we conjecture that its marginal impact
would be the same if we preserve the total amount of
bandwidth per position. Nevertheless, a proper analysis
should be conducted.
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9.2 Interaction with other path selection
algorithms
Waterfilling, like the current path selection algorithm,
is used to perform preemptive built of circuits (circuits
are built before the user needs them). Some other path
selection algorithms have been designed to choose the
path between built circuits that maximizes an objective
function [10, 34, 41]. An interesting research direction is
to look for a combination of different approaches. In this
spirit, a combination of destination naive AS-awareness
[10] and Waterfilling on relays might lead to better se-
curity against relay adversaries and network adversaries
with minimal loss of performance. We may even com-
pare this strategy against a mix of Waterfilling on relays
and on ASes.
10 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a solution to both balance the
network and optimize the diversity in endpoints of Tor
circuits. This method is called Waterfilling and could
be applied in most of the network load cases detailed in
the directory server specifications.
We carry out a security analysis of our scheme
with the help of information theoretic metrics and with
an empirical estimation over time of the probability
until a first path compromise. This estimation is ob-
tained from a modified version of TorPS that imple-
ments Waterfilling. We suggest using guessing entropy
as a new metric to indicate the strength of the Tor net-
work against relay adversaries at a static point of time.
Indeed, guessing entropy captures more aspects than
previously used theoretic-information metrics and its
meaning may be more informative about the hardness of
breaking anonymity, compared to previous notions, like
diversity. We show that the guessing entropy increases
by about 130 to 150 nodes, or about 25% for any mo-
ment throughout the period we consider; meaning that,
on average, an adversary would have to corrupt around
130 more nodes before being able to complete a traffic
correlation attack at a given time.
Our security analysis shows also that, when us-
ing Waterfilling, a relay adversary needs to control 35
guards in order to obtain the same attack success prob-
ability as an adversary controlling the top guard in the
current Tor network. We conjecture that taking control
of 35 nodes while remaining undetected is a consider-
ably higher challenge than controlling a single one.
We also perform a performance analysis of Waterfill-
ing. Using Shadow, we set up a private network of ≈ 800
nodes. Our results show a small degradation of per-
formance that might be considered negligible. Indeed,
about 97% of Tor circuits constructed with Waterfilling
gives the same performance as the circuits constructed
by Tor ABWRS.
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A Security Models and Metrics
A.1 Guessing entropy - example
Suppose we have a Tor network with 3 guard nodes and
2 exit nodes. From the selection process, suppose we
have the following matrix with pi,j the probability to
selection guard i with exit j
P =
 1/6 1/185/18 1/3
1/24 1/8

Let G = ∅ the set of prioritized guards and E = ∅ the
set of prioritized exits. q is computed in the following
way:
– q1 = 0
– q2 = max(P ) = 1/3, {g2} ∪G, {e2} ∪ E
– q3 = max_marg_prob(P)
= max(PrG=x, P rE=y)
= max[max(
∑
y∈E
Pr(G = x, E = y)∀x /∈ G),
max(
∑
x∈G
Pr(G = x,E = y)∀y /∈ E)]
= max(1/8, 5/18) = 5/18, {e1} ∪ E
– q4 = max_marg_prob(P)
= max(1/6 + 1/18, ∅) = 2/9, {g1} ∪G
– q5 = 1/24 + 1/8, {g3} ∪G
Then:
N+K∑
i=1
i.qi = 3.22
B Waterfilling
Bandwidth-Weights
B.1 Waterfilling on the guard+exit
flagged nodes
Waterfilling can also be applied on Guard+Exit flagged
nodes when a part of the bandwidth of this pool has to
be given to the middle one. In the time period we took
to evaluate Waterfilling, it happened when the network
load case was 3bE=S.
Suppose there are K nodes with the guard+exit
flag, and let BWi be the bandwidth of the i-th
guard+exit flagged node with the highest bandwidth.
Then we had the following constraint on the top of clas-
sical bandwidth-weights:
Wdi ∗BWi =Wdi+1 ∗BWi+1 ∀i ∈ (0, N) (23)
0 ≤Wdi ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ (0,K) (24)
Wdi = 1 ∀i ∈ (N + 1,K) (25)
K∑
i=0
WdiBWi = (Wgd+Wed) ∗D (26)
Solving with these constraints gives NWdi, then we
can compute:
Wmdi = 1−Wdi
Wgdi =Wdi ∗ Wgd
Wgd+Wed
Wedi =Wdi ∗ Wed
Wgd+Wed
